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Abstract. Four decades ago, Brazilian officials plotted designs for colonization and resource 
extraction in Amazonia; subsequently the region has become a test-lab for successive development 
regimes. Along the Santarém-Cuiabá Highway (Br-163) in the state of Pará, residents have engaged in 
a range of licit and illicit activities as official development policy has shifted throughout the years. Despite 
assertions that living along the unpaved road is tantamount to “being stuck” in place and time, residents 
move widely throughout the region, using the road, trails, streams, and rivers as thoroughfares. I argue 
that “being stuck” functions as a discursive label for illegible mobilities and the speculative economies 
they support as agrarian reform clients, ranchers, and others compete for position in anticipation of the 
road’s paving. Novel forms of resource speculation result from the labor of moving and maintaining 
anticipatory structures along the road, a process that remains obscure from state development projects.
Keywords: mobility, intimacy, futures, participatory development, Amazonia.
La autopista diferida de Brazil: movilidad, desarrollo 
y anticipación del estado en la Amazonia
Resumen. Hace cuatro décadas, funcionarios del gobierno brasileño diseñaron planes para la 
colonización y extracción de recursos en la Amazonia; desde entonces, la región se ha convertido en un 
laboratorio de prueba para sucesivos regímenes de desarrollo. Quienes habitan a lo largo de la carretera 
Cuiabá-Santarém (Br-163) en el estado de Pará, han participado en una serie de actividades lícitas e 
ilícitas, mientras que la política oficial para el desarrollo se transforma a través de los años. A pesar de las 
Brazil’s deferred highway: mobility, development, and anticipating the state in Amazonia  / 103
afirmaciones según las cuales vivir a lo largo de la carretera sin pavimentar equivale a “estar atrapado” en 
un lugar y en el tiempo, los habitantes se mueven ampliamente en toda la región, utilizando la carretera, 
trochas, arroyos y ríos. En este artículo sugiero que “estar atrapado” funciona como un rótulo discursivo 
para las movilidades ilegibles y las economías especulativas que dichas movilidades sostienen. Mientras 
el mundo de lo ilegible y lo especulativo prospera, los programas de reforma agraria, los ganaderos y 
los otros actores intentan posicionarse en espera de la pavimentación de la carretera. Nuevas formas 
de especulación alrededor de los recursos empiezan a consolidarse como consecuencia de la labor de 
mover y mantener “estructuras de anticipación” a lo largo del camino, un proceso que permanece en la 
oscuridad para los proyectos de desarrollo estatales.
Palabras claves: movilidad, intimidad, futuros, desarrollo participativo, Amazonia.
Opening
It’s easy to lose one’s way on the picada heading into the woods east of Bigode’s 
homestead along the unpaved Santarém-Cuiabá (Br-163) highway in the Brazilian 
Amazon. In the area around Castelo de Sonhos, where Bigode and I are hiking with 
a friend from another roadside settlement, it is common for a colonist to confuse his 
picada —essentially a long forest trail that doubles as a boundary marker— with 
someone else’s. “When that happens,” Bigode explains, “it’s usually just the case that the
poor sunuvabitch is lost, and wanders into some strange area, where sometimes 
the other guy is waiting and just shoots him. Happens around here a lot,” he says, and 
adds some nonchalant emphasis by flinging a stick at a nearby brazil-nut (castanheira) 
tree trunk. The stick comes to rest near our friend Raimunda, a fellow agrarian reform 
activist who is visiting Castelo de Sonhos to participate in a regional participatory 
planning seminar. “We wouldn’t want to get stuck out here,” she quips, “Or else those 
guys from Brasília might have to come out here and get us!” We decide to turn back 
so as not to miss the “participatory development seminar” that promises to discuss 
the latest plans to pave the long abandoned Br-163 highway that links this former 
gold-mining region in the midst of the Amazon rainforest to the expanding agricultural 
heartland of Brazil’s center-west.
As we hike the eight kilometers back to Castelo, I ask Bigode and Raimunda 
what they are more scared of-taking the wrong picada home or missing the chance to 
participate in the development seminar. “That’s easy,” Bigode answers, “what we need 
to be afraid of is not getting the government’s attention, finally after all these years. If 
we don’t, there will be a maze of picadas out here soon.” “And a bunch of pistol-men 
patrolling them,” Raimunda adds. Bigode admits the stakes couldn’t be higher: “If 
more money and guns muscle up from the south, then that’s the end for us. We’ve got 
to convince the government that we’re stuck, out here on this road. If it’s to be paved, 
it can’t be paved on our backs.”1
1 This conversation took place on May 15, 2007, in Castelo de Sonhos district, municipality of 
Altamira, Pará, Brazil. The meeting which we later attended was regional a regional seminar in 
which the Federal government and a semi-public research agency (EMBRAPA) divulged the 
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In this exchange Bigode and Raimunda are highlighting, with a wink and a 
nudge between them, their working knowledge that contemporary debates over 
development in Amazonia are structured by a need to identify villains and victims. 
Stuck between the prospects of being blamed for the forests’ destruction on the one 
hand and the daily realities of violence, displacement, and government inattention 
on the other, longtime colonists like Bigode and Raimunda willfully construct 
themselves as needing help. In this framing, these smallholder colonists (posseiros) 
are literally and metaphorically stuck in an out-of-the-way place with little hope for 
social mobility, given government inattention and the risks of being associated with 
more recently arrived ranchers, loggers, or speculators.
Each year since the Br-163 Highway was inaugurated in 1974, seasonal rains 
have rendered the road impassable for four to seven months out of every twelve. 
Land reform colonists such as Bigode and Raimunda are only one social group that 
narrate the region as retrograde, as truckers, ranchers, and even itinerant river traders 
describe the area’s woes through use of the same idiom: “stuck,” not moving. Yet 
as I show in this paper, this claim to being stuck is a situated and tactical diversion 
away from the undeniable facts of life in Amazonia: people move, and in so doing 
construct vibrant economies and relations. As the Brazilian government has recently 
turned towards a participatory development model in Amazonia, native residents, 
long-time settlers, and non-local speculators have found themselves in a chorus of 
voices calling for governance and investment along the Br-163 highway. Why these 
diverse groups, despite their differences, would each narrate the region as stuck in 
arrested development is the paradox from which this paper begins (vide figure 1).
The available literature on colonization in the Amazon —and for that matter 
the attitudes and pronouncements of government and NGO planners (Alencar, 2005; 
Brazil, 2006)— seems to endorse the idea that life along the Br-163 is stuck. The 
standard histories of government megaprojects in the region see roads as having 
paved the way for deforestation and the expansion of cattle ranching rather than any 
intended socioeconomic benefits of land reform (Schmink and Wood, 1992; Nugent 
and Harris, 2004). While this explanation may hold along the paved and more thickly 
settled Transamazonian Highway, the unpaved and rather inchoate Br-163 shows 
that land reform colonists did not wholly give way to loggers, gold-miners, ranchers, 
and land mafia speculators in quick succession (compare Moran, 1979). Nor did 
governance simply vanish, as national banks continue to finance large agricultural 
projects and government corruption plays a key role in local economies (Modesto 
dos Passos, 2007: 34-41). People arrived and continue to move throughout the re-
results of a three-year zoning study within the “Area of Influence of the Br-163.” This study, 
known as ZEE (Zoneamento Ecológico-Econômico), was discussed in an audience of approxi-
mately 500 Castelenses at the Catholic pavilion in the settlement. See Baletti (2012) for more on 
the participatory zoning process in Pará.
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gion, and if we follow their mobile practices, we see how Amazonians piece together 
unofficial economies that remain vital precisely because of official misrecognition. 
When called upon to participate in planning seminars or otherwise interact with 
distant bureaucrats, a diverse array of roadside residents deploys a refrain of “being 
stuck” along the Br-163 highway. Yet these same residents constantly engage in 
speculative activities in the effort to become economically (and spatially) mobile: 
being-stuck thus serves as a prophylactic, constructing a buffer of official ignorance 
to the illegible mobilities of a cross-section of Amazonians.
Figure 1. Map of Study Area
In this paper I employ a research methodology developed by ethnographers 
studying mobility along Amazonian rivers, where they have found that rhythms of 
movement help construct senses of place and social obligation (Harris, 2000; Raffles, 
2002). I apply these insights to the dynamic mobilities and interactivities that attain 
along the Br-163 in and around Castelo de Sonhos. After a brief review of the history 
of development in Amazonia, I will trace the arrival stories, daily itineraries, and 
economic practices of two very different residents of Castelo de Sonhos, Bigode 
and Claudio, as they move widely throughout the region. As these men profess their 
lack of physical or economic mobility, they also negotiate —by moving about the 
landscape— a range of anticipatory practices that help them cement ties to places, 
resources, and the mutual obligation of others along the road. To understand the 
relationship between residents’ unofficial mobilities and speculative practices, I 
develop the concept of intimate mobilities to track those mobile practices through 
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which roadside residents construct future-making projects that make selective use of 
development promises and rumors. This is patchy ground, where migration stories 
and histories of developmentalism layer upon one another, bringing the territorial 
practices of native peoples, rubber tappers, exhausted goldminers, agrarian refor-
mers, ranchers, and real estate barons into close proximity. Rather than taking for 
granted residents’ admissions of “being stuck” and therefore disconnected from the 
rest of Brazil, attending to the intimate mobilities of roadside residents opens to 
the practices through which new relations to old promises are being worked out in a 
“forgotten” frontier zone in Amazonia. Residents’ itineraries, and the stories to which 
they attach themselves, reveal an array of future-projects roadside dwellers have in 
mind for the region, situated as they are in locally manifest histories of violence, 
speculation, and affiliation.
Development in Amazonia: From Ditadura to Participation
The dream of a north-south artery linking central Brazil to the Amazon River first 
circulated in print in 1844, in a short pamphlet passed around the imperial court which 
argued that a railroad should be built where the Santarém-Cuiabá Highway (Br-163) 
would eventually come to be located. Brazil’s version of continental expansionism got 
its first formal theorist in 1931, when Colonel Mário Travassos popularized the notion 
that the central government should invest in infrastructure and resettlement in the 
nation’s vast Amazonian possessions (Travassos, 1947). After the military dictatorship 
(ditadura) came to power in 1964, leading generals hailed Travassos’s ideas and 
made them the foundation of the junta’s “security, sovereignty, and development” 
stance towards Amazonia. In a now famous phrase, President-General Emilio Medici 
announced that roads, agrarian reform resettlement, and other broad investments 
in the region “will link land without men in Amazonia to men without land in the 
Northeast” (1970: 79). The east-west Transamazonian Highway and its north-south 
equivalent, the Br-163, were the first roads to be built during the ditadura’s “Natio-
nal Integration Plan” (1970-1974); the Transamazonian was largely paved from the 
start, whereas the Br-163 has been paved gradually over the last three decades, and 
only in Mato Grosso state.2
Analysts rightfully critique the ditadura for the arrogance and short-sightedness 
of its Amazonian development plans. Many read the “failure” of the generals’ roads 
to secure socially- and ecologically-just development as very much the point: agrarian 
reform was not a real priority for the junta, which only ever desired a military, and 
later corporate, presence in the region (Bunker, 1985; Little, 2001). If development 
2 Adrian Cowell, close associate of the indigenist Vilas-Boas brothers, accompanied an advance 
crew of natives and government scouts who were charged with surveying the Br-163’s right-of-
way and removing indigenous groups to the Xingú National Park (1973).
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“failed” to provide land and opportunities to Brazil’s poor, the regime’s backers could 
be assuaged by the impressive figures sustaining the erstwhile “Brazilian miracle” 
(Schmink and Wood, 1992: 58-89). Ethnographers have chronicled how contradictory 
federal policies towards the Amazon encouraged violent confrontations between cor-
porations and peasants, especially along the Transamazonian Highway (Schmink and 
Wood, 1992; Hecht and Cockburn, 1989), and in the larger ambit scholars have argued 
that the generals’ roads —unmanaged and unpoliced— are ultimately responsible for 
the Amazon’s haphazard settlement and alarming deforestation rates (cf. Fearnside, 
2007; Lisansky, 1990, London & Kelly, 2007). These approaches, though powerful in 
their illumination of the role that roads have played in the repeated making and unma-
king of Amazonian development policy, have told us little about the conduct of daily 
life along the roads themselves. When critics do see roads as populated and socially 
diverse, roadside communities nonetheless seem predestined as vehicles for inevi-
table “frontier expansion” (Foweraker, 1981) or as embattled societies in the midst 
of a receding natural world (Lisansky, 1990, Schmink & Wood, 1992). Elsewhere I 
have argued that there exists a wide gap between the figural developmental plans 
articulated at great distances from the Amazon and the material realities that sett-
lers, speculators, and migrants confront and construct as they move through the 
region at the behest of such state visions (Campbell, 2012). Logistical challenges 
of traveling along unmaintained highways in the region notwithstanding, migrants 
continue to come to Amazonia, pushed by the imbalance of resources in other 
parts of Brazil or pulled by rumors of gold or other prospects. Along the unpaved 
Br-163, residents certainly have inherited “failed” government policies, and have 
also engaged in widely destructive economic activities, but the sheer remoteness 
of the region and its distinctly rural character set it apart from the roads analyzed 
and critiqued in the literature.
The Brazilian and international press lately has begun focusing on the ex-
pansion of soy cultivation on the southern fringes of the Amazon rainforests, and 
the Br-163 is very much at the center of this unfolding drama (cf. London & Kelly, 
2007). Two themes emerge in this coverage, the first of which echoes foregoing 
scholarly work on Amazonian roads: in addition to presenting stark deforestation 
figures, journalists describe towns along the road as tinder-boxes of social unrest, 
defeatism, and ennui. Though these people received “development,” one observer 
notes, “they are in desperate need of truly sustainable choices” (Philips, 2006). The 
second prevailing theme in this coverage is the measured hope that soy cultivation 
might provide the incentive for consistent government attention in the region. Tax 
revenues from soy farms will “finally attract governance,” and strike a balance bet-
ween “rational productive activity and conservation” (London & Kelly, 2007: 115; 
cf. The Economist, 2004). “Stuck” since having been duped by broken development 
promises, Amazonians seem poised to receive progress with a program that “recon-
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ciles growth with respect for the environment,” while also, “providing opportunities 
for all to share in the wealth.”3
It is not surprising that popular media outlets would promote these two visions 
of roadside life —fraught with decay, but retaining one last hope for progress— as it 
is these very images that are promoted in the policies put forward in Brazil’s latest 
development plan to pave the Br-163 (Brazil, 2006). Inspired by good-governance 
sociology (Sachs, 2001) and conceived with input from a broad array of public ins-
titutions, research NGOs, multi-lateral lenders, and roadside residents like Bigode 
and Raimunda, the “Plano Br-163” proposes to pave the Br-163 to achieve several 
economic, ecological, and social goals (cf. Alencar, 2004, 2005; Margulis, 2003). 
Though the plan has its critics (notably Fearnside, 2007) and it remains unrealized 
at the time of writing, this “participatory and sustainable development plan” for 
paving the Br-163 responds to the critiques leveled at the ditadura’s methods and 
goals.4 While it cannot undo what has been done, one official described the Plano 
Br-163 to me in the following way: “it’s the right vehicle for getting funds to the 
region, for pumping life back into it, while also securing the future of conservation 
and traditional peoples’ rights.”5 Whereas the generals built their roads to secure 
territory, the Plano Br-163 looks to build a road to ensure a stable, rational, and tho-
roughly modern region, and proposes to do so by way of a deliberative, transparent, 
and democratic process.
In forty years, the endpoint of Brazilian developmentalism has shifted, but it 
is not altogether different: the generals and the democrats both dream of a proper 
road and the kinds of efficient and legible mobilities that go with it. Traveling from 
Cuiabá to Santarém would take only twelve hours on a hardtop road (instead of 
nearly four days now), and the difference here is both the result and harbinger 
of progress. I would like to interrupt this tendency —among backers and critics— to 
interpret good mobilities as standard, fast, and modern. In so doing, I engage with 
3 This spike in popular attention paid to the impending paving of the Br-163 can be linked to the 
year-on-year rise in global commodity prices, which for soy and rice have been rising steadily 
since 1995 (Steward, 2007). In 2000, the North American cereal giant Cargill constructed a grain 
elevator and shipping facility in Santarém, and hopes to receive cereals from Mato Grosso via a 
newly-paved Br-163. The retooling of western Pará’s infrastructure for grain export has caused 
tremendous controversy, and the Cargill facility has been subject of many campaigns by Green-
peace and other activist organizations. A federal court order closed the grain elevator was closed 
during my fieldwork due to irregularities in the facility’s environmental impact reports.
4 Barbosa de Almeida (2002) and Chernela (2005) are foremost among many who have chronicled 
how social movements (among rubber tappers or fishing communities) pressed for the end of 
the dictatorship, and have subsequently engaged a patchwork of development realities since the 
abertura (democratization), including the proliferation of global actors (NGOs and multi-lateral 
lenders) on the scene.
5 Conversation with a Brazilian Forest Service official, Santarém, May 28, 2007.
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ethnographers of riparian communities throughout the Amazon, who have keenly 
observed the ways in which slow and deliberate travel rhythms synch with labor, 
the upkeep of kin relations, and the maintenance of intimate local knowledges along 
rivers (Harris, 2000: 125-64; Raffles, 2002: 180-206). Away from development de-
liberations, mobility occupies many more states than “stuck” or “modern”.
Following mobilities within development encounters offers two key insights 
into social relations along the Br-163. First, as I traveled to and from dozens of 
public meetings along the road in 2006-07, it became clear that the “development 
state” that appeared so inert in documents and policy papers is stitched together in 
social practice. Engaged and knowledgeable bureaucrats were neither out-of-touch 
nor unsympathetic to roadside peoples as they came to know them through their 
travels (see Mathews, 2011). Nor were state representatives naïve to the range of 
licit and illicit activities that supposedly “stuck” villagers were pursuing. NGO 
activists and low-level officials were often critically self-aware of the limits of 
dialogue, the relative “thinness” of state promises, and the logistical challenges to 
implementing policy, no matter how well-conceived (Mosse, 2005) (vide figure 2).
Figure 2. Stuck in the Mud, outside Castelo de Sonhos (February 2008)
Second, Br-163 residents’ mobilities powerfully illustrate that there is much 
more going on in rural people’s daily lives than progressive narratives might pre-
dict. Thus even if development is seen as a failure, and even if roadside residents 
are resignedly critical of the state’s ability to deliver on decades worth of promises, 
people continue to engage state plans. This is a different formulation from that 
110 / Boletín de Antropología, Vol. 27 N.º 44, segundo semestre de 2012. Universidad de Antioquia
of James Ferguson, who has argued that Zambians have experienced “a crisis of 
meaning,” leaving them abjectly hopeless as they come to see modernization as a 
myth (1999: 14). Though the ethnographic details of Zambia and Amazonia differ 
greatly, roadside residents (especially native groups and agrarian reform colonists) 
have suffered similar disappointments and abjection. I offer that our ethnographic 
analysis should not end with this “end of development” dystopia; instead, I am drawn 
to how rural peoples challenge “specific structures and processes of disconnection” 
when they move to forge unofficial connections with one another, landscapes, and 
state actors (Ferguson, 1999: 238).
Intimate Mobilities and Speculative Practices
Taking mobilities seriously means taking forms of intimacy seriously. In a highly 
influential formulation, Michael Herzfeld develops the concept of “cultural intimacy” 
in order to get inside how “social actors use, reformulate, and recast official idioms 
in the pursuit of often highly unofficial personal goals” (2005: 2). For Herzfeld, the 
formal doctrines of the state —the authorized versions of life along the Br-163, for 
example— are juxtaposed to their pragmatic actualities, in which “intimate self-
knowledge” is worked out, locally and surreptitiously. Applying this distinction 
to Amazonian development encounters, we can see narratives of being-stuck or 
being-abandoned by a corrupt state as “pervasive essentialisms” effective at both 
the official and vernacular levels (Herzfeld, 2005: 3-14). Along the Br-163, residents 
participate in constructing these essentialisms, and take part in official development 
encounters (public meetings, documents, planning commissions), which no one 
trusts represent reality fully. By meeting the requirements of being-stuck, roadside 
residents make themselves legible to the prevailing development optic: if they are 
stuck, they must require the state’s attention and patronage (Scott, 1998). In practi-
ce, roadside residents who play along with the official rhetoric of development are 
ensuring that their vernacular practices —which include moving and speculating and 
(for some) growing fabulously wealthy along the Br-163— remain uninterrogated 
by the developmentalist state.6
I am interested in the kinds of moving, forms of relation, and modes of na-
rrating daily life that fall out of official discourses but nevertheless help structure 
residents’ livelihoods and future prospects; after Herzfeld, I am calling these intimate 
mobilities. When analyzing these practices, the distinction between “official” and 
“vernacular” seems to blur, and here Kathleen Stewart’s recent work on “ordinary 
affects” is instructive. Stewart contends that “public feelings begin and end in broad 
circulation, but they’re also the stuff that intimate lives are made of” and that “public
6 I am grateful to Andrew Mathews for suggesting the correlation between Herzfeld’s views on 
“cultural intimacy” and my own observations on the publicly-private realms of interaction along 
the Br-163.
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and private spheres draw into a tight circuit, giving the ordinary the fantasy quality of
a private life writ large on the world” (Stewart, 2007: 2-3, 104). It is this language 
of fantastically unpredictable concomitance of the public and the private that I would 
like to apply to stories and circulations along the Br-163. Development encounters 
are shaped by much more than the instrumentalism of patron-client relations between 
the state and subjects, and tracking to what degree on-the-ground behaviors match 
official rhetoric only takes analysis so far. For squatters, itinerants, and ranchers 
along the Br-163, there is a familiarity with locally salient rules of engagement 
—even amongst putative enemies— that remains obscure to government prescriptions 
about Br-163 subjects and their futures in development (cf. Bobrow-Strain, 2007).
Intimate mobilities are important because it is via the peculiar character 
of circulation along the Br-163 that people create speculative practices that both 
anticipate the state’s next moves and function beyond the state’s regulatory reach. 
Through the daily routines of moving and affiliating, by gathering and spreading 
resources and rumors, and in curating and telling histories that seem charged with 
the capacity to predict the future, roadside residents pursue speculative activities 
and come to know and narrate future-projects. By tracking these itineraries and 
outlooks, we encounter an improvised realm of resourcefulness, what Anna Tsing 
has called “the quick, erratic temporality of rumor, speculation, and cycles of boom 
and bust” that literally produces the frontier as an imaginative project “capable of 
molding both places and processes” (2005: 59). In this strange public-private realm, 
people move to interact with (or remain obscure from) the state, the lines of legality 
and illegality persistently shift, and the world of resources can become imbued 
with an irresistible attraction, charm, and agency. Knowing your way around these 
affective nodes requires an intimate familiarity with formal rules and government 
expectations, but also with possibilities and lines of flight. In this analytic, roadside 
residents appear very differently than either the development optic or the literature 
on Amazonian roads predicts: rather than being-stuck, squatter, rancher, and itinerant 
migrant alike are constructing and negotiating a realm of public intimacy wherein 
secrets are known and prophylaxes like “stuckness” come to be thinkable.7
In Amazonian studies, much attention has been paid to the most renowned 
cultural practice associated with speculative activities in the rainforest, grilagem. 
“Grilagem” refers to the common practice of falsifying land claims to make them 
look authentically old;8 in this scheme, prospectors or agents of the grileiro mafia 
secure large parcels of land for real estate speculators by paying off government 
7 Herzfeld, in his analysis of Cretan property regimes shifting during the period of Crete’s autonomy 
(1999), gives a wonderful example of the concomitance of public and private knowledges in 
making state regimes of legibility.
8 The word derives from the Portuguese for cricket, “grilo”, due to the practice of placing false deed 
documents in a box of crickets, hastening the browning and “aging” processes. For more detailed 
analysis of grilagem and other land schemes in contemporary Amazonia, see Campbell (2009).
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officials, forging documents, and running off other squatters by force. The prevailing 
academic critique of grilagem historicizes it as an outgrowth of the military regime’s 
corrupt push into the Amazon in the 1970s: financial backers of the grileiro gangs 
responded to the threat of inflation in the Brazilian economy by securing salable, 
tax-free assets —Amazonian land— to use as leverage in sunnier economic times 
(c.f. Louriero & Pinto, 2005; Margulis, 2003). In grilagem, absentee “owners” co-
llude with their agents in the field to secure land, bribe government officials, and 
terrorize smallholders who may have settled legally. The end of the 1970s brought 
the end of many hopes for agrarian reform in Amazonia and the retrenchment of the 
federal agencies responsible for titling and managing vast tracts of land. Though 
many individual prospectors and agrarian smallholders like Bigode and Raimunda 
stayed on, grileiros began earnestly to secure parcels of land to sell to absentees, 
often resulting in horribly violent confrontations (cf. Oliveira, 2006). This type of 
grilagem —in which a vertically-integrated regional, national, or international cor-
poration seeks to horde land as a value sump— still occurs in Amazonia, as critics 
and officials hasten to point out. What the literature has missed, however, is that the 
methods through which grilagem is practiced have widely diversified away from 
the two classic methods of document fraud and chasing off squatters.9 In anticipa-
tion of future development plans, both humble and powerful actors have taken up 
the delicate, dangerous, and intimately situated work of forging documents and 
patrolling land parcels. Grilagem-as-speculation is an example of a public-private 
secret, pulled off by actors who intimately know their surroundings and, in another 
register of intimacy, know the risks involved in trying to turn illict into right and 
proper claims on future development resources. Though officially the Brazilian 
government has begun to crack down on grilagem in Amazonia, the ethnographic 
accounts in the following section suggest that the practice is more widespread now 
than ever, especially as efforts to pave the Br-163 fuel speculation in land values.
Along the Br-163, grilagem is the principal speculative activity, and it shim-
mers with intimate affect: official stories circulate of single men owning forest 
tracts the size of France, and are quickly followed by vernacular versions in which 
goons nab a recalcitrant homesteader, beat him to a pulp and deposit his near lifeless 
body in a sack of rock salt. Government agencies commit to “operations” to limit 
real estate fraud, pistolagem and other illegal activities, but rumors of their surprise 
raids circulate long before officials appear, often only to receive a bribe (propina). 
9 Hecht (1985) was as early observer of how grilagem leads to intensive agribusiness in Amazonia, 
as early posseiros clear homestead lands, then sell out to (or are forced out by) grileiro syndicates, 
who in turn profit from selling the land to ranchers, loggers, other absentee owners, government 
officials, or colonization companies. See also Schmink & Wood (1992) for comparative material 
on land fraud and political corruption in Amazonia; also, Holston (2008) offers a useful analysis 
of land swindling in the context of urban São Paulo.
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Rumors of murderous and corrupt land reform activists interrupt public allegations 
of collusion between illegal loggers and the leaders of an indigenous group with 
newly-demarcated land. Stories of sheer violence and sheer accumulation seem to 
follow on one another, and in Castelo de Sonhos the social logic of land speculation 
has a determining force that draws entire communities into its orbit. These are stories 
of promise, of luck and of a certain survivalist swagger. But in these stories, and in 
the mobile and speculative practices that are their sources, we can also glimpse the 
lineaments of distinct future-projects. I turn to these now.
Moving around Castelo
Castelo de Sonhos —which translates as “Castle of Dreams”— is a town of 
4,200 people located along the Santarém-Cuiabá highway at a point where two rivers 
rise to flow north towards the Amazon. In large part due to the road’s impassability, 
the region around Castelo de Sonhos is thinly settled, resulting in a regional com-
munity that has persisted throughout several booms and busts in the local economy. 
The villa only received its evocative name eight years after it was first settled, when 
gold was discovered in the eastern hills and a song named “Castle of Dreams” was 
the only phonograph record the early prospectors had amongst them.
The Santarém-Cuiabá Highway remains unpaved south of the regional center 
Santarém all the way to the Pará-Mato Grosso border. Castelo de Sonhos is located 
150 km north of that border, making the closest city (Guarantã do Norte, Mato Grosso, 
where the paved road begins) a fifteen-hour bus journey during the dry season. During 
the wet season, travelers may remain stranded on buses or jeeps for days, awaiting 
tractors to dig them out the Br-163’s quick-mud. Technically speaking, Castelo de 
Sonhos is a district in the largest municipality in the world in terms of land: Alta-
mira, Pará. To reach the municipal seat, located along the Xingú River, the traveler 
requires at least five days along the Br-163 and Transamazonian Highways. Castelo 
de Sonhos is surrounded by recently declared indigenous territories,10 conservation 
units, and national parks.11 Though the village has few permanent native inhabitants 
10 The process of recognizing, demarcating, and homologizing indigenous territories in Brazil is 
notoriously slow. Along the Br-163, thirteen indigenous territories have been recognized since the 
implementation of the 1988 Constitution, but only one (Terra Indígena Kayapó-Mekragnotire) 
has been completely legalized: the process took 14 years, April 1994 through June 2008.
11 On February 12, 2005, the American-born Brazilian nun Dorothy Stang was assassinated in the 
rural section of Anapú, along the Transamazonian Highway. Perhaps fearing the international 
reaction that accompanied Chico Mendes’s assassination under similar circumstances seventeen 
years earlier, the Lula administration quickly responded by declaring nine new conservation units 
and national parks in western Pará. This action caused outrage in Castelo, where some longtime 
residents found their properties unilaterally incorporated into “paper parks.” Some immediately 
sold out to grileiros, while others vowed to stay on, betting that park lines could be renegotiated.
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(of the Baú and Mekragnotire ethnicities), Castelo’s population is rather evenly split 
between nordestinos —mostly smallholder farmers or agrarian reform clients born 
in Brazil’s impoverished Northeast—and sulistas or gaúchos, migrants to Amazonia 
from southern Brazil who are mostly descended from early 20th C. European immi-
grants. Roughly speaking, the former arrived when Castelo’s main street was still 
an airstrip that the garimpeiros (gold miners) used, whereas the latter began arriving 
in the early 1990s, pursuing ranch and farmlands. Sulistas typically brag that it was 
they who leveled off the old airstrip and turned it into a proper avenue, São Antônio.
By 1986, over 10,000 prospectors were living and working in the region, drawing 
attention from financial backers in São Paulo as well as from landless workers throug-
hout the country. The forests around Castelo de Sonhos swelled with land claims, and 
the resultant tenure confusion gave rise to the most infamous gold baron in Brazilian 
history, Márcio Martins, otherwise known as “Rambo.” Martins built several dozen 
airstrips to transport gold, cash, workers, cocaine, and at least one gubernatorial 
candidate in and out of Castelo de Sonhos. At his height, he commanded over forty 
gold mines and had at least 6,000 garimpeiros working for him. Rambo’s demise at 
the hands of the Brazilian army in 1992 brought with it a population exodus from 
Castelo, in which thousands fled to large Amazonian cities. Those who stayed be-
came involved fledgling industries like timber or ranching, or began cutting picadas 
through the forest, laying claim to abandoned properties (vide figure 3).
Figure 3. “The Rambo of Amazonia,” Márcio Martins
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Castelenses are fond of recalling the “Rambo” years, even if they were not 
in the area at the time of his exploits.12 When recalling their own personal histories 
in the region, residents will deploy the wild-west image “Rambo” cuts to opine on 
Castelo’s remoteness from the state, how seemingly anything goes here. Stories of 
Rambo —and of other larger than life figures— can reveal a very precise, morally-
charged way of speaking about others’ movements (fluxo) and resource-extraction or 
speculation (pescar). Stories highlighting the region’s fluxo —or flux, dynamism— 
comment on the ways in which residents rarely stay in the same place after the arduous 
initial migration to Amazonia. People move about: checking on opportunities, visiting 
associates or kin, making requisite appearances before a bureaucrat, even if they have 
a home base in a small village like Castelo. This fluxo becomes a point of contention 
for those who desire a more “settled,” less frontier-like regional social fabric. Those 
who move around with the intention of quickly striking it rich in gold, timber, or 
real estate, are said to be “pescando,” or fishing for opportunities. The more in flux 
the region becomes, in this idiom, the more opportunists, drifters, and no-account 
adventurers will pass through looking for a score. Perhaps not surprisingly, this 
resolute localism which critiques outsiders is in fact more often deployed amongst 
long-term residents (with 10+ years) in Castelo de Sonhos. As ranchers and squatters 
vie for the moral high ground by trading accusations of “merely fishing,” they 
animate a tension in which each community displaces accusations of fecklessness 
onto the other while refusing to allow one’s own speculative or hasty activities be 
interpreted as pescando.
In the wake of the gold bust, many former prospectors also found employment 
as pistol-men or squatters in the economy of grilagem. My hiking companion Bigo-
de, an Afro-Brazilian migrant who arrived in Castelo de Sonhos in 1976, estimates 
that two hundred people have died there in squabbles over land tenure since 1995 
(see Simmons 2005 for a region-wide account). Violence accompanies daily travels 
through the bush, and many smallholders who attempted to confront the grilagem 
gangs have been murdered in Castelo. Since the assassination of the activist Bar-
tolomeu Moraes da Silva in 2002, the land reform movement has stalled and splin-
tered into rival factions. Bigode is one of the remaining activists who are working 
to establish a communal settlement named in da Silva’s honor. He points out land 
reform in the region, “is challenged by the fact that none of the folks signed up to 
get land are around much!” He puts a fine point on this: “It’s the way things started 
12 From January to May 2007, I conducted a household census survey in the village center of Castelo 
de Sonhos, and I later expanded this set to include residents in key rural settlements (principally 
former gold mines and ranching conglomerates). From August 2006 through Dec. 2007, I 
interviewed over 350 individuals along the Br-163 throughout western Pará, and conducted life 
history interviews with 51 individuals in Castelo de Sonhos. The following discussion is based 
on meetings with “Bigode” on March 12th & May 19th, 2007, and with “Claudio” on April 2nd, 
17th & Nov. 9th, 2007.
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for people who came here to Amazonia, so every few months you just expect to 
move. And after a while you have kin or relations from Belém to Porto Velho, plus 
the folks you left behind. Everyone wants a piece of land, but a city job becomes 
more attractive, or your mother gets sick and you have to go to her”.
Bigode was born in the northeastern state of Ceará, but left for a land reform 
settlement along the Transamazonian Highway in 1971. After ten months, he left the 
settlement, as the government was not providing housing or agricultural assistance. 
Bigode relocated his wife and child to the Tapajós River town of Itaituba, but left his 
family there in 1976; he has not seen them since. During the dry season of that year, 
Bigode first traveled —via hitching and hiking— the length of the Br-163 south from 
Itaituba all the way to Mato Grosso state. He soon headed back north, walking along 
the unpaved Br-163, until he came to Castelo de Sonhos. Bigode spent 1979 through 
1983 in the forest, opening up trails, following streams, and hunting and foraging.
After gold was discovered in 1982, Bigode started to earn quite a bit more 
through his work as a trailblazer. Bigode’s knowledge of the forest around Castelo, 
and his familiarity with the rubber-tapper communities living along the upper Curuá 
River helped facilitate the goldrush of 1982-1992 in the area, a fact for which he 
expresses some guilt today. With several other long-term residents, in 1994 Bigode 
staked a claim by cutting picadas to mark a 100-hectare plot of land a few kilome-
ters north of Castelo de Sonhos. The squatters took turns patrolling their lands from 
grileiros, keeping the men too busy to work. To this day Bigode retains effective 
ownership over his parcel of land as a farmer who does not farm. Instead, he makes 
a living as a trader throughout the rural sections of Castelo. He explains:
So many people are just waiting, you know, for the land situation to get figured out. So 
only “the big guys” [os grandes] farm, and the rest of us wait to be vindicated. But that 
means there’s a lot of valuable stuff on our lands, stuff that we can trade, like Brazil-nuts, 
fruits, fish, and palms. We produce what the big guys can’t anymore since they cut down 
the trees (fieldwork conversation).
Every week, Bigode visits several dozen rural squatters to facilitate trade, using 
a bicycle or motorbike to negotiate the Br-163 and several side-roads and picadas. 
Twice a year, at the beginning and the end of the rainy season, he takes a barge along 
the Iriri River to visit old gold-mining communities in the interior. While there, he 
trades, advances loans, and shares stories about the price of land, plans to pave the 
road, and the most recent influx of migrants. “Those camps are depressing,” Bigode 
admits, “and although I make some money from them, I would rather have those 
miners start to squat with us as colonists (posseiros). But they’re too frightened of 
the grileiros running them off.”
Bigode is interested in a smallholder future for the Amazon, and speaks elo-
quently in favor of this at planning meetings in Castelo and beyond, condemning 
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the activities of absentee landlords and ranchers. Still, Bigode does not see recent 
arrivals as the only challenge to land reform along the Br-163, despite the 300% 
spike in the unofficial value of land in the past two years. He is quick to point out 
that “the little guys” (os pequenos) also engage in violent and fraudulent grilagem. 
Two years ago, smallholder colleagues recruited Bigode to scout out an area for a 
new sustainable foresting project to settle some of the area’s landless poor. After 
completing his work, Bigode learned that the settlement was a fraud. He learned from 
a forest department official passing through Castelo that the land he had surveyed 
was part of a newly declared national park, and therefore off-limits to claimants. In 
subsequent visits, Bigode discovered three clandestine airstrips being used to remove 
parcels of noble woods out of the region. Each airstrip had a makeshift sawing area, 
where mahogany and castanheira trunks are cut into manageable parcels, loaded 
onto a single engine plane, then smuggled south. Bigode believes that this illegal 
operation is receiving the blessing of corrupt federal officials, and that leaders of 
rival land reform factions profit from the sale of the wood.13
In the woods east of Castelo, knowing your way around is imperative. Picadas 
can disappear altogether after a grileiro sends a crew with chainsaws to widen it 
or to hem it in. If smallholders do not walk their picadas regularly, as Bigode says, 
“that invites encroachment.” At the end of his picada, just at the point where other 
paths marking other homestead claims meet, is a portage point for an old gold-miner 
barge, one of the most active spots in the bush east of Castelo. If you cross the river 
and begin walking along the trail to the southeast marked by a mahogany tree and a 
St. Christopher’s shrine, you will eventually arrive at Claudio’s ranch, some 12 km 
from Castelo. Claudio bought three smaller parcels of land (totaling 450 hectares) 
in 1993, when he arrived from Mato Grosso state. Since that time, he has earned a 
reputation as a no-nonsense businessman who hates smallholder squatters almost 
as much as he hates absentee landowners and their grileiro goons.
“The frontier is here to be occupied,” Claudio states plainly one morning over 
the southerner’s drink of choice, chimarrão. “There’s no other way to see it, and I 
wish the government would do something about it.” Claudio, now 45 years old, grew 
up believing that the United States and U.N. had designs on Amazonia, and would 
soon occupy it if Brazilians did not quickly civilize the region. Before moving to 
Castelo, Claudio, his wife, and brother were part of a land reform settlement program 
13 Though Bigode is angry with his fellow smallholders who here were engaging in grilagem under 
the cover of a “sustainable development project,” a more sympathetic analysis might show how 
these “green” squatters were simply trying to compete with other, more cut-throat speculators 
who were systematically breaking unions, assassinating leaders, and dashing hopes for agrarian 
reform settlements. I thank Mark Anderson for pushing me to see this; his analysis (2007) of how 
Garifuna activists in Honduras have positioned themselves as indigenous in order to enlist state 
support in fending off land speculation illuminates a similar process.
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in Peixoto de Azevedo, Mato Grosso. They had a small farm, and managed to save 
enough through odd jobs to purchase land outside Castelo “free and clear” of the 
government. Claudio was born in Paraná in the extreme south of Brazil, and initially 
came north to Mato Grosso to work the gold fields there in the late 1980s. He fondly 
likens his migration to Amazonia to his own grandfather’s migration from Germany 
to Brazil at the end of the First World War.
Accounts of post-ditadura migration to Amazonia state that migrants like 
Claudio filled a regional vacuum left by mismanaged agrarian reform along regional 
highways (Lisansky 1990). Claudio’s history in Castelo suggests a messier affair: 
like many sulistas in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, Claudio asserted 
himself in Amazonia amidst a fraught land tenure situation wherein legality was 
ambiguous, state organs were present but corruptible, and the criteria for proving 
ownership were ambiguous and contradictory. After clearing between 50% and 80% 
of standing forest on parcels to “prove” ownership, grileiros sold 300-500 hectare 
lots to the highest bidder, often with the guarantee that squatters and other claimants 
would be “cleaned” off the property. However, as part of an emerging regional elite 
in Castelo, Claudio works to secure the hegemony of the notion that southerners 
took it upon themselves to fill, and civilize, an empty space in Amazonia.
Despite the fact that he was once a beneficiary of agrarian reform in Mato 
Grosso, Claudio is opposed to creating new settlements, especially in Amazonia. 
He cites as evidence for his position:
They don’t work. Look at the land reform settlement here, it’s empty, and those who are there 
are worthless. The government is too far away, and none of those people really want that land 
to work on, they just want corrupt bureaucrats to sign the land over to them so they can sell 
it. Then, they’ll go blow their money on sex and liquor. They just sit on their land and wait 
for more handouts! (fielwork conversation).
In public planning meetings, Claudio speaks for a laissez-faire approach to 
settlement, in which the government builds all-weather roads and protects property 
rights. He publicly laments the fluxo he sees in the region, and argues that settlers 
have had to take the law into their own hands to protect themselves from those who 
pass through the region pescando. His daily routines make Claudio’s Castelo distinct 
from that of Bigode: he leaves his home in the village, checks grain and livestock 
prices at the market, then on occasion meets with other members of the land-owners 
association over which he presides. He often visits other members’ small farms, too, 
all of which Claudio proclaims have been “purchased legally, grilagem free.” Though 
Claudio is proud to own his land, he is reluctantly aware of the fact that the smaller 
lots he bought were almost certainly sold to the previous tenants by grileiros. Rum-
bling along in a pick-up to his ranch east of Castelo, Claudio is careful to avoid any 
confrontations with the region’s grileiros as they hold down properties for absentee 
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landowners in southern Brazil. He boasts: “I’ve been pretty high on their wanted list, 
for the work we’re doing getting farms set up. They just want to run us off.” Claudio 
is rumored to have killed at least two grileiro pistol-men who threatened his brothers’ 
properties just south of Castelo. Nominally, he is a rancher, though due to transport 
difficulties ranchers in Castelo can only keep up appearances: cattle get fat in the 
fields as they graze, but can only be marketed locally because of the unpredictable 
Br-163. From January through August, Claudio makes a usurious profit from pulling 
stuck vehicles out of the Br-163’s mud with his Caterpillar tractor.
The key feature of Claudio’s vision for Amazonia is private property. Shortly 
after the Br-163 was completed in 1974, the military government proclaimed that 
100 km on either side of it would become federal property, destined for land reform 
or colonization. Due to this fact, and the ambiguities that corruption and grilagem 
introduce, buying and selling land along the Br-163 is a risky deal, and often tech-
nically illegal. Claudio maintains strong connections with colleagues from Paraná, 
German-descendents like himself who feel crowded out of the land market in southern 
Brazil. Like Bigode, Claudio sees a respite from the violence and arbitrariness of 
grilagem through thickening the numbers of people who see a similar future for 
Amazonia as he does. If Bigode’s compatriots are spread throughout Amazonia as 
so much flotsam of earlier booms and busts, Claudio’s ilk are in southern Brazil, still 
yearning for open country and room to breathe on the frontier. Both visions seem to 
require government intervention, and both visions are situated in histories of occu-
pation, survival, and accommodation to Amazonian realities. Both men narrate their 
projections from a stylized position of being stuck between anarchic violence and the 
irredeemable boredom of being marooned in an unproductive forest. These stylized 
self-presentations as “stuck,” put forward through use of various Portuguese words 
(travada, parada, abandonada, etc.), stand in marked contrast to these colonists’ 
everyday mobile practices.
Just as Bigode’s illegible mobilities allowed for him to participate in, then 
denounce, smallholder fraud at a sham settlement, Claudio’s speculations also 
depend on official ignorance. Neither man wants the “broad reach of governance,” 
though both have used just this phrase in appealing for proactive interventions. For 
Claudio’s part, he is keen to be tipped off when the federal forest service predic-
tably visits Castelo each dry season to fine (or receive bribes from) illegal lumber 
extractors. Claudio gets his flatbed truck ready for a harvest of sorts. He explains: 
“Inexperienced loggers drop their loads when they hear or see the forest service 
around.”Claudio seizes on the opportunity: he and 3-4 workers patrol the side roads 
between Castelo and the old gold fields, and load up any logs and pieces that had 
been dropped by nervous smugglers. Though he is shy to admit it, Claudio directs 
his harvest of contraband wood south to associates in Mato Grosso and beyond, over 
circuitous forest trails and picadas.
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Constructing Abandonment
In a recent book exploring “the will to improve” as a constitutive element of deve-
lopment practice, Tania Li highlights some of the complexities of rural relations to 
expert knowledges: even well-meaning experts fail in their attempts to comprehend 
the nuances and peculiarities of local societies (Li, 2007). Yet still, the “will to im-
prove” presses all sides in development encounters, leaving a discourse and a stance 
towards improvement, progress, and development as common currency between 
varied social actors —technocrats, indigenous groups, smallholder farmers, or local 
politicians— that bring different motives and meanings to bear. In their interactions 
with the government and NGO architects of the recent sustainable development plan 
to pave the Br-163, Bigode and Claudio both call for a vague but decisive government 
intervention in the region. In a certain light, these men could not be more different: 
Bigode is an Afro-Brazilian migrant campaigning locally for land reform with real 
teeth, a man who has spent most of the last three decades in Castelo de Sonhos scou-
ting, trading, and squatting. As a counterpoint, Claudio is a white southern settler 
dreaming of a civilized agricultural frontier, even as he engages in open warfare 
with the very grileiros whose speculative and violent property regime has prepared 
the lands around Castelo for southern migrants. In March 2007, both men spoke on 
a shared stage in front of traveling government officials and planners in Castelo de 
Sonhos, imploring them to pave the road and bring progress to the region. Later, 
Bigode and Claudio would travel 900 kilometers to Santarém (the former by bus, an 
eight day journey; the latter by Hillux pick-up truck, and made it in two) to describe 
Castelo de Sonhos as “poor,” “tired,” “abandoned,” stuck in another era.
Despite their clear differences, both men favor a paved Br-163, and to distant 
planners, both Claudio and Bigode appear to be exhibiting the will to improve. 
However, I read their common narratives of lack and disconnection as tactical 
deployments of a generic road-dweller. Neither Claudio nor Bigode are operating 
under false consciousness when they sublate their particular histories when speaking 
for development. Rather, the proliferating claims to being-stuck fit within the local 
logic of invention and speculation traced here in Bigode’s and Claudio’s arrival 
narratives and daily itineraries. In line with David Cleary’s observation that “Ama-
zonians actually seek out risk, since in a highly inflationary economy the ideal is not 
incremental gain but large, short-term payoffs,” I see Bigode and Claudio inviting 
development opportunities in a common idiom, then positioning themselves within 
local legacies of development as a kind of gamble (Cleary, 1993: 347).
This claim to being-stuck requires the invention of a public persona of road-
dweller: this is, generically, the colonist who came to Amazonia at the invitation of 
government schemes from 1974 onward. This colonist was just doing what he was 
told, is not responsible for the alarming deforestation or murder rate statistics, and 
in fact is entitled to redress from the government. All Castelenses have a version of 
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this story, but within the micropolitics of land tenure, and the forms of relation and 
corruption that hold together the social practice of grilagem, subject-positions relate 
differently to the narrative of collective abandonment. In the examples of Bigode and 
Claudio above, both privately admit to the less sanguine activities they have been 
involved with over the years in Castelo, and each continues to pursue these activities 
in a speculative spirit. What to the outside seems like generic abject lack becomes 
more clearly a field in which difference and alliance are negotiated when viewed up 
close: the stuck road dweller is one kind of prophylactic tactic that fits within a larger 
historical structure of gambling with development (vide figure 4).
Figure 4. Castelenses participating in development workshops, March 2007
The appearance of stuckness is both required by and a function of the logic of 
development-from-a-distance in Amazonia. The state’s reformist turn to pave the 
Br-163 and atone for past development mistakes originates in analyses conducted in 
Brasília and Belém, far from the highway. From this distance, Bigode and Claudio 
realize, one had better appear as a victim of prior development failures rather than 
as an opportunist. In being-stuck, roadside residents signal a justification for out-
side intervention, even as they position themselves locally to profit from or adjust 
to possible future developments. The participatory development model —forged 
with neoliberal democracy in mind— does not recognize the historical layering of 
previous development schemes in Amazonia. The Plano Br-163 sees speculation 
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only as crime to be stomped out by aggressively combating criminal gangs and their 
corrupt associates. It does not recognize the speculation inherent in Bigode’s and 
Claudio’s personal histories or daily itineraries, nor does it reconcile their widely 
different visions for the future of their homelands. In theory, participatory develop-
ment gathers discrete “stakeholders” to the table, incorporating nominal differences 
between a range of subject-citizens into a big-tent development dream. In practice, 
different groups along the Br-163 are faced with the same overdetermined “choice” 
as in previous development packages: when called upon, say “yes” or “no” to the 
plan on offer, then work out the unpredictable real-life effects on the ground with 
the aplomb, inventiveness, luck, or sheer power of the speculative.
Why do roadside residents present themselves as being-stuck for development 
audiences, and for that matter why are both Claudio and Bigode in favor of a paved 
Br-163? A paved road offers no clear benefit to either man, as it comes without 
guarantees for agrarian reform, the legalization of the land market, soy expansion, 
conservation, or governance. Still, the possibility that after so many years the state 
will do something with the Br-163 is one possibility (among many) to which residents 
like Bigode and Claudio must make certain concessions: this possibility is the source 
of their instrumentality. A paved road would change the rules of engagement along 
the highway, and both men see a proper Br-163 as amenable to discrete regional 
futures. However, neither is waiting for the manifestation of state promises: being-
stuck to participate in official development proceedings is just one sort of gamble 
along the unpaved Br-163.
Castelo residents enter into a range speculative gambles without complete 
knowledge of outcomes, of competitors’ motives, or access to the myriad factors 
that influence the unfolding of events, but not without tools (rumors, myth, guns, 
affiliations, mobilities) to influence the outcome of the gamble: this is the kind of 
in situ speculation that has interested me in the paper, and the kind that has been 
largely understudied in academic accounts of grilagem or Amazonian development. 
The logic of moving-to-speculate —what I have suggested calling intimate mobi-
lities— reveals much about how subjectivities (e.g. “land reformer” or “southern 
colonist”) and discourses (“sustainability,” or “participation”) settle out in social 
practice, and are made to perform appropriate functions at opportune times. Still, 
even an instrumental prophylaxis such as “being stuck” is deployed to ward off 
official scrutiny, it also comes to inhabit an affective realm in which its effects are 
transitory and indeterminate. In the intimate, public-private space of open secrets, 
being-stuck matters less and less as a position in development praxis: in these sto-
ries we have seen it as a cipher in struggles over resources, livelihoods, and futures 
along the Br-163.
In this paper, I have argued for the importance of considering intimate mobilities 
and anticipatory practices as a dynamic realm of politics and social reproduction 
that often goes unmarked in contemporary debates around Amazonian development. 
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Behind the scripted development encounters in which colonists and officials agree 
that the region is in need, there is a public-private realm of speculative practice that 
is dependent on colonists’ intimate knowledge of the surrounding region. Here I have 
suggested that, instead of taking engagements with the developmentalist state at face 
value —narratives of stuckness, hopefulness, or abjection— we should instead view 
roadside residents’ relationships to development narratives as distinctively situated 
projects. I have argued that intimate mobilities are a realm of politics not recognized 
by official discourses, and that the reformed development optic sees roadside residents 
as stuck, a refrain which they in turn endorse. Focusing on speculative intimate prac-
tices, roadside residents do not look at all how the development optic would predict, 
as either victims of past errors or as stable populations awaiting state intervention.
For over thirty years in Castelo de Sonhos, residents have received and 
worked through development promises, rumors, and programs through practices 
of speculation—forging fragile alliances, squatting, keeping secrets and spreading 
misinformation. The specific forms that residents’ future-making projects take are 
situated in their relations to one another, knowledge of the landscape, connections 
to outside capital, and their abilities to negotiate systems of corruption, the politics of 
appearances, and the occasional lucky break. As Bigode’s and Claudio’s stories 
illustrate, visions of the future become plausible tools with which to articulate 
subject-positions in the making: though both are stuck, both are clearly going different 
places as they wait out what might happen next. A kind of insurance policy, “being 
stuck” constructs a buffer of official misrecognition of extant realities; beyond this 
buffer residents continue moving, and speculating, in historically structured ways. 
The realities of their daily movements rhetorically concealed, Claudio, Bigode, and 
others are free to call upon the state to decisively pull the Br-163 into a developed 
future, even as they position themselves to benefit from government inaction.
Acknowledgements
This paper is based on fieldwork carried out in western Pará from July 2006 to 
March 2008, which was funded by the Wenner-Gren Foundation’s Dissertation 
Research Award and the U.S. Department of Education’s Fulbright-Hays Doctoral 
Dissertation Research Abroad Fellowship. I presented a version of this paper at the 
2008 Meetings of the Society for Cultural Anthropology Meetings in Long Beach, 
California; elements of this paper are also derived from my dissertation, Campbell 
(2009). Mark Anderson, Heath Cabot, Madeline Otis Campbell, Susan B. Coutin, 
James Ferguson, Andrew Mathews, Hugh Raffles, and Anna Tsing offered helpful 
insights and comments on written versions of this paper. Many thanks are also due 
to Ane Alencar, Steven Alexander, Douglas Araújo, Luis Augusto, Rosanna Costa, 
Vilson Ketterman, Paulo Leandro Leal, and Irineu Matthes in Pará. Thanks also to 
124 / Boletín de Antropología, Vol. 27 N.º 44, segundo semestre de 2012. Universidad de Antioquia
the editors and reviewers at the Boletín de Antropología. All translations are my own, 
and I have used pseudonyms where appropriate. All photos by author.
Works Cited
Alencar, Ane (2004). Desmatamento na Amazônia: Indo além da “Emergência Crônica” Insituto de 
Pesquisa Ambiental da Amazônia, Belém do Pará.
____________ (2005). A pavimentação da Br-163 e os desafios à sustentabilidade: uma análise 
econômica, social, e ambiental. Insituto de Pesquisa Ambiental da Amazônia, Belém, Pará.
Anderson, Mark (2007). When Afro Becomes (like) Indigenous: Garifuna and Afro-Indigenous Po-
litics in Honduras. In: Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology, Vol. 12, N.o 2, 
Colchester, UK, pp. 384-413.
Baletti, Brenda (2012). Ordenamento Territorial: Neo-developmentalism and the Struggle for Territory in 
the Lower Brazilian Amazon. In: Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 39, N.o 2, London, pp. 573-598.
Barbosa de Almeida, Mauro (2002). The Politics of Amazonian Conservation: The Struggles of Rubber 
Tappers. In: Journal of Latin American Anthropology, Vol. 7, N.o 1, Colchester, UK, pp. 170-219.
Bobrow-Strain, Aaron (2007). Intimate Enemies: Landowners, Power, and Violence in Chiapas. Duke 
University Press, Durham.
Brazil: Federal Government’s Interministerial Working Group (2006). Plano de Desenvolvimento 
Regional Sustentável para a Área da Influência da Rodovia Br-163. Brasília.
Bunker, Stephen G. (1985). Underdeveloping the Amazon: Extraction, Unequal Exchange, and the 
Failure of the Modern State. University of Illinois Press, Urbana.
Campbell, Jeremy (2009). The Social Life of an Amazonian Highway: Speculation, Mobility, and 
Development Politics in Brazil. PhD. dissertation, Department of Anthropology, University of 
California, Santa Cruz.
____________ (2012). Between the Material and the Figural Road: The Incompleteness of Colonial 
Geographies in Amazonia. In: Mobilities. Vol. 7, N.o 4, London, pp. 481-500.
Chernela, Janet (2005). The Politics of Mediation: Local-Global Interactions in the Central Amazon of 
Brazil. In: American Anthropologist. Vol. 107, N.o 4, Hoboken, NJ, pp. 620-631.
Cleary, David (1993) After the Frontier: Problems with Political Economy in the Modern Brazilian 
Amazon. In: Journal of Latin American Studies Vol. 25, N.o 2, Cambridge, UK, pp. 331-349.
Cowell, Adrian (1973). The Tribe that Hides from Man. Pimlico, London.
The Economist (2004). Asphalt and the Jungle: A road project in the Amazon may be the world’s boldest 
attempt to reconcile growth and conservation. July 22, London.
Fearnside, Philip M. (2007). Brazil’s Cuiabá-Santarém Highway: The Environmental Cost of Paving 
a Soybean Corridor Through the Amazon. In: Journal of Environmental Management Vol. 39, 
N.o 5, Atlanta, GA, pp. 601-614.
Ferguson, James (1999). Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian 
Copperbelt. University of California Press, Berkeley.
Foweraker, Joe (1981). The Struggle for Land: A Political Economy of the Frontier in Brazil from 1930 
to the Present Day. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Harris, Mark (2000) Life on the Amazon: The anthropology of a Brazilian Peasant Village. The British 
Museum, London.
Brazil’s deferred highway: mobility, development, and anticipating the state in Amazonia  / 125
Hecht, Susanna (1985). Environment, development and politics: capital accumulation and the lives-
tock sector in eastern Amazonia. World Development Vol. 13, N.o 6, Atlanta, GA, pp. 663-684.
Hecht, Susanna, and Alexander Cockburn (1989). The Fate of the Forest: Developers, Destroyers and 
Defenders of the Amazon. Penguin, London.
Herzfeld, Michael (1999) Of Language and Land Tenure: The Transmission of Property and Informa-
tion in Autonomous Crete. In: Social Anthropology, Vol. 7, No. 3, Cambridge, UK, pp. 223-237.
____________ (2005) Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-State (Second Edition). Rout-
ledge, London.
Holston, James (2008). Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in Brazil. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Li, Tania Murray (2007). The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of 
Politics. Duke University Press, Durham.
Lisansky, Judith (1990). Migrants to Amazonia: Spontaneous Colonization in the Brazilian Frontier. 
Westview Special Studies on Latin America and the Caribbean, Boulder.
Little, Paul E. (2001). Amazonia: Territorial Struggles on Perennial Frontiers. Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity, Baltimore.
London, Mark and Brian Kelly (2007). The Last Forest: The Amazon in the Age of Globalization. 
Random House, New York.
Loureiro, Violetta and Pinto, Jax Nildo Aragão (2005). A questão fundiária na Amazônia. Estudos 
Avançados, Vol. 19, N.o 54, São Paulo, pp. 77-98.
Margulis, Sergio (2003). Causas do Desmatamento na Amazônia Brasileira. World Bank-Brasil, 
Brasília.
Mathews, Andrew (2011). Instituting Nature: Authority, Expertise, and Power in Mexican Forests. 
The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Medici, Emílio Garrastazu (1970). O Jogo da Verdade. Imprensa Nacional, Brasilia.
Modesto dos Passos, Messias (2007). Br-163: De Estrada dos Colonos A Corredor de Exportação. 
Editorial Masoni, Maraingá.
Moran, Emilio (1979) The Trans-Amazonica: Coping with a New Environment. In: Brazil: Anthropo-
logical Perspectives. Maxine L. Margolis and William E. Carter, (eds.), Columbia University 
Press, New York.
Mosse, David (2005). Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice. Pluto, 
London.
Nugent, Stephen, and Mark Harris (eds.) (2004). Some Other Amazonians: Perspectives on Modern 
Amazonia. Institute for the Study of the Americas, London.
Oliveira Pinto, Mariana (2006). Entre o Sonho e a Realidade: Desafios da Política Ambiental na 
Amazônia. Master’s dissertation, University of Brasília Center for Sustainable Development.
Phillips, Tom (2006) Life Drains Away from Towns Built on Destruction of the Amazon Rainforest. 
The Guardian, London.
Raffles, Hugh (2002). In Amazonia: A Natural History. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Sachs, Ignacy (2001) O Estado e os parceiros sociais: Negociando um pacto de desenvolvimento. In 
Pereira et al., Sociedade e Estado em Transformação. Editora UNESP, São Paulo.
Schmink, Marianne, and Charles Wood (1992). Contested Frontiers in Amazonia. Columbia University 
Press, New York.
126 / Boletín de Antropología, Vol. 27 N.º 44, segundo semestre de 2012. Universidad de Antioquia
Scott, James C. (1998). Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition 
Have Failed. Yale University Press, New Haven. 
Simmons, Cynthia S. (2005). Territorializing Land Conflict: Space, Place, and Contentious Politics in 
the Brazilian Amazon. In: GeoJournal. Vol. 64, New York, pp. 307-317.
Steward, Corrina (2007). From Colonization to “Environmental Soy:” A Case Study of Environmental 
and Socio-Economic Valuation in the Amazon Soy Frontier. In: Agriculture and Human Values. 
Vol. 24, New York, pp. 107-122.
Stewart, Kathleen (2007). Ordinary Affects. Duke University Press, Durham, NC.
Travassos, Mário (1947). Projeção Continental do Brasil. Companhia Editora Nacional, Rio de Janeiro.
Tsing, Anna (2005). How to Make Resources in Order to Destroy Them (And Then Save Them?) on 
the Salvage Frontier. In: Histories of the Future, Daniel Rosenberg and Susan Harding, eds., 
pp. 53-73. Duke University Press, Durham, NC.
